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RESUMO
No presente artigo procuramos, tendo em mente as imperfeições de mercado apontadas 
pela literatura e pela experiência internacional, e com base em dados originais da indústria 
farmacêutica, relacionar empiricamente o preço de medicamentos no Brasil com algumas 
variáveis explicativas. Encontramos que, consoante com estimações anteriores da experiên-
cia norte-americana, os medicamentos líderes no Brasil, antes da lei que instituiu o medi-
camento genérico, acomodavam o avanço de produtos similares (do mesmo princípio ativo, 
porém sem o teste de bioequivalência) e se recolhiam a segmentos inelásticos do mercado, 
elevando seus preços. Os similares, ao contrário, ao perderem mercado, reduziam seus 
preços em relação ao líder, de modo que uma redução no índice de concentração do mer-
cado total de um princípio ativo tem efeitos ambíguos sobre seus preços, dependendo se a 
causa é uma queda da participação do líder ou um rearranjo dentre os seguidores.
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ABSTRACT
Bearing in mind the market failures pointed out by the economic literature and following the 
international empirical evidence, and based on original micro data of the Brazilian pharma-
ceutical industry in the late 1990s, this article attempts to relate empirically drug prices 
in Brazil to some explaining variables. We find that, similarly to previous U.S. estimations, 
leading branded drugs accommodated share growth of the followers, turning towards a more 
inelastic market segment and raising their prices. On followers, in turn, a fall of the concen-
tration index in a market had ambiguous effects: if due to reduced leader power, followers 
raised their relative prices; if due to a tougher competition within the fringe, their relative 
prices tended to go down.
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INTRODUCTION
Expenditures on pharmaceutical drugs have grown at quite high rates in the 
developed countries in the last decades. Amounts grew 3.5 percent a year 
in real terms in the OECD countries in the 1980s and 4.6 percent between 
1990 and 1996. (RÊGO, 2000). Pressures for public health expenditure 
control intensified in Europe and in the USA from 1970 on, when the 
governments realized the need to place an effective control on the rising 
demand for public health services. In 1997, according to OECD, about 80  
percent of total health expenditures in Western European countries came 
from public sources, including drug expenditures. The latter, in turn, rep-
resent in average 15 percent of total health expenditures. As a consequence, 
the adoption of public policies aiming to reduce drug prices became one of 
the most important issues in the health policy debate.
In Brazil, expenditures on drugs are not reimbursed neither by public nor by 
private sources (with a few exceptions, such as the Aids program and some 
drugs for continuous use). Because of their high share in the households’ 
consumption basket, especially in the poorest strata, combined with price 
raises traditionally above inflation — whenever the Government did not run 
any price control —, the pharmaceutical industry has always been targeted 
by society. In the present article, we try to relate empirically drug prices to 
some explaining variables, based on original micro data of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, and bearing in mind the market failures pointed out by the 
literature and following the international evidence. We hope thus to shed 
light on the current debate with some econometric foundations. 
In the next section, we discuss particular features of the pharmaceutical 
industry’s supply structure, and the effects of informational asymmetries 
on the demand structure due to the nature of the good. We also point out 
the main regulatory approaches adopted by developed countries. In the 
second section, we describe the industry and the consumption behavior 
in Brazil, as well as the evolution of Brazilian government policy applied 
to the industry. The third section brings a brief review of recent empirical 
studies on the effects of generic drugs in other markets. The fourth section 
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introduces our model for the industry behavior in the second half of the 
1990s, describes the data utilized and reports the main results obtained 
with the model. The last section sums up the conclusions.
1. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES IN THE MARKET FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COMPETITION POLICIES: 
1.1 The Pharmaceutical Industry
The modern pharmaceutical industry is characterized by very high Research 
and Development (R&D) investments and by a consequently high inno-
vation pace, and dates back to the mid-1930s, when the first important 
group of antiinfective drugs was introduced, with research spreading out 
to other therapeutic areas after World War II. (VISCUSI, VERNON & 
HARRINGTON, 1995, p. 847).1 As a whole, the industry is currently not 
so concentrated: the 20 world greatest companies accounted for just 52.6 
percent of global sales in 1996, and the leader reached only 4.4 percent. 
In Brazil the concentration ratio is greater, but not so much: the top 20 
firms in the industry owned 63 percent of the total market in 1998, and 
the leader Novartis reigned over 6.5 percent of the market only. The best 
selling drug Cataflam (also from Novartis) responded for only 1.5 percent 
of the total market. Nonetheless, this seeming market pulverization hides 
extremely high concentration ratios in the relevant markets, defined either 
by the therapeutic classes or by the pathologies themselves (see Table 1.1 
with Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes for selected markets, 
defined by the Active Principle).
1 According to the PhRMA report (2000), this industry recorded in 1999 the highest share of 
R&D on sales among all industries in the U.S. (12 percent if we take the whole industry, or as 
high as 20.8 percent if we restrict ourselves to the research-based pharmaceutical companies 
— that is, the ones based on prescription drug sales and R&D).
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TABLE 1.1
 S
ub
cla
ss
Active Principle Leading Brand La
b
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
C05B0 Polysulfuric HIRUDOID SKY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P01B0 Albendazole ZENTEL SB- 0.50 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.33
J01C1 Amoxicillin AMOXIL SB- 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.41
C07A0 Atenolol ATENOL ZNC 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.62
J01F Azithromycin ZITROMAX PFZ 1.00 0.55 0.31 0.23
C08A0 Amlodipine Besylate NORVASC PFZ 0.89 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.72
C09A0 Captopril CAPOTEN BMS 0.87 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.71
N03A0 Carbamazepine TEGRETOL GEIGY NVR 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96
J01D1 Cefalexin KEFLEX LLY 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.78
J02A0 Ketoconazole NIZORAL J-C 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.41
A03F0 Cisapride PREPULSID J-C 0.66 0.61 0.50 0.46 0.41
R05C0 Ambroxol Chlorhydrate MUCOSOLVAN B.I 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.46
A08A Amphepramone Chlorhydrate INIBEX S MY_ 0.71 0.62 0.60 0.62 1.00
S01E2 Betaxolol Chlorhydrate BETOPTIC S ALC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
J01A Doxycycline Chlorhydrate VIBRAMICINA PFZ 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.80
N06A0 Paroxetine Chlorhydrate AROPAX SB- 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.80
A02B1 Ranitidine Chlorhydrate ANTAK GWC 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26
N04A0 Selegiline Chlorhydrate NIAR KNO 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.41
C03A3 Chlortalidone HIGROTON GEIGY NVR 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
D03A0 Dexpanthenol BEPANTOL ROC 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
M01A1 Potassium Diclofenac CATAFLAM GEIGY NVR 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.84
R01A1 Beclometasone Dipropionate BECLOSOL AQUOSO GWC 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.68
A13A2 Panax Ginseng GINSANA B.I 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
G04B2 Finasteride PROSCAR MSD 0.72 0.59 0.52 0.50 0.40
A10B1 Glibenclamide DAONIL HMR 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92
R06A0 Loratadine CLARITIN SHC 0.99 0.93 0.86 0.77 0.70
N05C0 Lorazepam LORAS WYE 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93
C02A1 Methyldopa ALDOMET PDM 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.88
J01G1 Norﬂoxacin FLOXACIN MSD 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.31
C04A1 Pentoxifylline TRENTAL HMR 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.84
D10A0 Benzoyl Peroxide SOLUGEL STF 0.63 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.60
H02A2 Prednisone METICORTEN SHC 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.89
C01E0 Propatylnitrate SUSTRATE BMS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
D07A0 Clobetasol Propionate PSOREX GWC 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
R03A1 Salbutamol AEROLIN GWC 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97
G01A1 Secnidazole SECNIDAL RHD 1.00 0.89 0.75 0.48 0.33
C10A1 Simvastatine ZOCOR MDS 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.76 0.69
D08A0 Thiomersal MERTHIOLATE LLY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
D01A1 Tioconazole TRALEN PFZ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
M03B0 Tizanidine SIRDALUD NVR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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For the present status of the pharmaceutical industry, a lot has been con-
tributed by researches in chemically based pharmacology and by the startup 
of production in industrial scale of chemically isolated substances resulting 
from those researches. Since the first patent was granted to a pharmaceutical 
product in the 1940s, the innovating firms turned to patents to restrict ac-
cess to production and commercialization of their products and thus became 
able to monopolize temporarily their market. The temporary monopoly of 
the product is important for the innovating firm to assure a captive market 
that will later perceive a cost (if subjective) in experimenting a competing 
generic version and substitute it for the original brand when the patent 
expires. During this monopolistic period, the innovating firm is able to 
extract rents that will remunerate its initial investments in Research and 
Development (R&D) on that product and on so many others that did not 
succeed therapeutically or commercially.
The fast pace of development of new medicaments imply in profound vari-
ations of market leadership. Many drugs that are current market leaders in 
their therapeutic classes simply did not exist ten years ago. The introduction 
of a revolutionary innovation may propel a laboratory to a leading role in the 
industry in no time. Thus, the industry may be characterized by an infinity 
of overlapping product life cycles composed of three phases in each market: 
ex-ante there is a lot of competition among the laboratories, especially for 
R&D investments; after this Darwinian competition for new products, a 
few successful products remain, each of whom enjoys in the meantime a 
monopoly in the stricter market of the Active Principle — but face compe-
tition of other substances directed to diseases in common (some of these 
substances having been introduced shortly after or before, and with very 
similar molecular structures); at this stage of monopoly of the substance, the 
firm’s market power increases as the drug is gradually disseminated among 
the doctors. Finally, when the patent expires, direct substitutes (generic 
copies) emerge, that raise the market competition level.
The patent plays a fundamental role in the dynamics of the pharmaceutical 
industry. Levin et al. (1987) found in interviews with executives of 130 
industries that the pharmaceutical industry was the one where patents were 
the most effective means to protect and appropriate returns from innova-
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tions on products and processes - but mainly on products. Mansfield (1986) 
sent questionnaires to 100 randomly selected firms in 12 manufacturing 
industries in the USA and concluded that without patents the pharmaceuti-
cal industry would be the most affected in failing to introduce the greatest 
number of products between 1981 and 1983. Protection is more effec-
tive on the pharmaceutical product than on the manufacturing process, as 
compared, for instance, to the electronic industry, because the object of the 
product patent is the molecule itself or a combination of molecules, whereas 
a same function in an electronic equipment may be emulated by different 
devices. The product is more effectively protected than the process because 
a same drug may be produced using several different chemical processes. 
(NOGUÉS, 1990).
Given the focus of patents on the chemical compound, the high number of 
innovations since the 1940s (peaking 54 in 1957, but contracting to half as 
much in the following decades) is not surprising.2 Actually it is questionable 
how many of the “innovations” recorded in the industry really pose new 
benefits to the consumers (PEPE & VERAS, 1995), but the debate is far 
from a consensus.3 At any rate, it is not an overstatement to assert that the 
strategy of introducing new products, rather than a concern of the labora-
tories in treating more and more diseases, is a spatial market preemption 
strategy, aiming at foreclosing all the possible market niches to potential 
entrants by occupying them first.4
2  Still, the evidence on causality from intellectual property enforcement to innovation is far 
from conclusive; actually some papers point out to the opposite direction of causality. See, for 
example, the article by SAKAKIBARA & BRANSTETTER (2001) and the literature cited in 
their conclusions.
3  For example, PELTZMAN (1973) utilized U.S. data and estimated that the cost of preventing 
ineffective drugs from entering the market was two to four times greater than the benefits that 
would accrue if more medicaments were approved and more rapidly. LICHTENBERG (1996a, 
1996b, 1998, 2001) estimated the contribution of pharmaceutical innovation to consumer 
welfare through reductions in mortality, morbidity and total medical expenditure. In all papers, 
Lichtenberg found large gains to consumers.
4  For more details on this kind of strategy, see TIROLE (1988, p. 282-285).
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Another important feature of the pharmaceutical industry is that its prod-
ucts are meant to treat diseases, so that an ineffective drug may pose the 
risk not only of being too expensive for its quality, but also of causing an 
adverse reaction (a side effect, another disease or even the patient’s death). 
The drug may also be completely ineffective for the patient’s recovery, either 
because he/she took the wrong medicine or in a wrong dosage, or simply 
because no adequate drug exists for his/her case.
Given that the market is unable to regulate itself, because of market failures 
to be discussed in the next section, the governments called upon themselves 
the responsibility of controlling medicaments available in the market. In the 
USA, the legislation on drug safety evolved in response to tragedies caused 
by unsafe drugs. Time spent by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) 
to approve a new drug rose from a maximum of 60 days in 1938 to an 
average of 14 months in 1963 and to an average of 37 months in 1986. 
Facing the increasing rigor of the Agency on safety concerns, and due to the 
increasing difficulty in creating drugs that signified cost and effectiveness 
advance, the total development time of new drugs also grew. As the labora-
tory had to apply for the patent and, at the same time, submit the substance 
to the FDA’s screening, the net patent coverage time was sacrificed until 
the approval was issued. On the other hand, generic substitutes faced the 
same tests imposed on the pioneer drugs, and this delayed original patent 
effective protection.
The Patent Restoration Act (also known as the Waxman-Hatch Act) worked 
twofold: on the one hand, it restored part of the patent lifetime lost because 
of the FDA tests lengthened by a 1962 Act; on the other hand, instead of 
replicating the pioneers’ tests, the generics had only to pass the bioequiva-
lence test. Thus, the Act pleased innovating companies by extending the 
patent lifetime and at the same time reduced enormously the lag between 
patent expiration and competitors’ entry.
Not only does the rigorous process of approving drugs by the competent 
agencies require costly testing in human beings, but also the great majority 
of market niches have been little by little occupied by the several innovations 
along the years. Adding things up, this has raised significantly the cost of 
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development of new substances: in the 1980s it varied between 140 and 
280 million dollars (DIMASI et al., 1991); in the 1990s, it amounted to as 
much as 350 million. (FAGAN, 1998). R&D expenditures’ share in firms’ 
revenues rose as well: in 1970 it was 8 percent; in 1980, it had reached 11.9 
percent; in 1996 it was already 13.5 percent; and in 2000 it topped 20.3 
percent. (RUPPRECHT, 1999; PhRMA, 2000). Greater and greater scale 
and scope economy requirements in research lines have also induced many 
laboratories to seek joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions.5
Generic drugs’ competitive entry and their rapid diffusion, thanks to health 
plans’ and regulatory agencies’ pressure, have also shortened the product’s 
effective monopolistic period and thus placed more pressure on the labo-
ratories for new discoveries.
1.2 Informational Asymmetries in Demand for Medicaments
To better understand the nature of the market for prescription drugs and the 
existing barriers to entry in it, it is convenient to make use of a classification 
of consumption goods according to the consumers’ ability to observe its 
quality attributes before or after its purchase. Thus, if this quality may be 
learned before purchase, the good is called a search good - this is the case 
of clothing, music albums, among others. If the quality can be verified only 
after it is bought (e.g. canned food, restaurant food), it is named an expe-
rience good.6 In other cases, the consumer may never be able to evaluate 
some aspects of the quality of the good; such goods have been christened 
credence goods7 because only a qualified professional is able to deliver this 
evaluation and certify them. This is the case of mechanic services, medical 
services, content of fluoride in a toothpaste, and even the nutrition facts 
of a ready-to-eat breakfast cereal.
6  Both names were coined by NELSON (1970).
7 See DARBY & KARNY (1973).
5  From 1985 to 1998 the pharmaceutical industry recorded 37 mergers and acquisitions above 
US$ 500 million.
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Lack of knowledge of a good’s quality and the inexistence of a certifica-
tion authority and/or legal norms and procedures to guide the certifica-
tion process create an important informational asymmetry and give the 
pioneer brands an advantage over the potential new entrants: once the 
brand’s reputation has been established, the consumers are reluctant to 
leave it for another one whose quality has not been verified, either by an 
authoritative agency or by a long period of market acceptance. Without 
this certification, new or almost unknown brands of similar products have 
difficulties in penetrating the market because of the enormous marketing 
costs needed. This natural barrier to entry may be removed or softened in 
two alternative ways: (i) through a deliberate action by the government in 
providing quality certification; (ii) through the competitors’ private action, 
replicating the information diffusion effort (combined with advertising) 
when introducing a new brand.
Prescription drugs fit perfectly the credence good description. Its purchase 
depends on the handing of a medical prescription. The physician is the 
choice maker and faces an increasing set of active substances, whose efficacy 
and safety are imperfectly known to him. His choice is conditioned by a 
list of factors, among them the education level and habits of the popula-
tion, contents of the medical school courses, government regulation and 
the pharmaceutical industry’s actuation, both in R&D and in marketing. 
(HEMMINKI, apud PEPE & VERAS, 1995). The lack of fluid, organized 
and consolidated information comparing the effectiveness of the available 
drugs in the market is a serious obstacle to a well-grounded appraisal of 
the physician on what medicament to prescribe, thus magnifying the effect 
of the pharmaceutical industry’s actuation. In other words, information 
fluidity is as important or more than its mere existence.
Hence, the physician’s decision process can be divided into two stages, each 
one involving a type of informational asymmetry:
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1. The physician chooses the most effective and safest treatment for the 
patient based on his academic background and professional experi-
ence, or on his peers’ experience, on his own learning in congresses, 
readings of medical journals or on his networking. However, Temin 
(1980), Hellerstein (1994) and Berndt et al. (2000) point out to the 
predominance of a behavior whereby prescription occurs out of habit 
or inertia. Diffusion of a medicament’s consumption generates infor-
mational externalities to the doctors, and it is fair to say that their pre-
scription habits follow a typical pattern of herd behavior. (BERNDT et 
al., 2000). Choice of treatment, including the occasionally prescribed 
medicament, defines the INTERSUBSTANCE COMPETITION, that 
is, competition between different active principles. 
2. The medicament can be described in three different ways: by the 
chemical name of the molecule; by the medical or generic name; or 
by the fantasy name, corresponding to the reference brand, i.e., the 
brand adopted by the patent holder, and to the brands created by 
imitators. Sales promotion uses to emphasize the fantasy name. The 
physician may prescribe the fantasy name or the generic name. Here 
is the INTRASUBSTANCE COMPETITION defined between the 
proper branded product and the generic and similar drugs. The infor-
mational asymmetries are twofold: the physician ignores the prices 
of the generic drugs and has reservations regarding their quality as 
compared to the reference product. Technically speaking, this com-
parison is defined by the following concepts:
(i) Bioavailability: how much of the active principle is absorbed by the 
blood flow, where and how much it works therapeutically; 8 
(ii) Pharmaceutical equivalence: Pharmaceutical Equivalents “are drugs 
containing the same salt or ester of the same therapeutically active molecule, 
in the same pharmaceutical quantity and state, and which may have identi-
cal excipients or not. They must comply with the same up-to-date specifica-
8 According to Resolution n. 84 of the National Health Surveillance Agency (March 19, 2002), 
bioavailability “indicates speed and extent of absorption of an active principle in a dosage form from 
its concentration/time curve in his/her systemic circulation or in his/her excretion in the urine.”
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tions of the Brazilian Pharmacopeia, and in the absence of them, with the 
specifications of other regulations authorized by the legislation in effect, or 
yet with other applicable quality standards, related to the identity, dosage, 
purity, power, content uniformity, half-life and dissolution speed, when it 
is the case.” (ANVISA – NATIONAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 
AGENCY, Resolution n. 84, March 19, 2002).
(iii)Therapeutic equivalence: “two medicaments are considered therapeuti-
cally equivalent if they are pharmaceutically equivalent and, after admin-
istrating the same molar dose, their effects with respect to effectiveness and 
safety are essentially the same - and this is evaluated through appropriate 
bioequivalence studies, pharmacodynamical tests, clinical tests or in vitro 
studies…” (ibidem). 
Two drugs are bioequivalent if they are therapeutically equivalent and have 
the same bioavailability.9 As we note on item (ii), two drugs may be phar-
maceutically equivalent and comply with quality standards, but this does 
not mean that their quality is the same.
A quality certification policy would thus have a role of signaling informa-
tion to professionals so as to correct two levels of informational asymmetry 
in distinguishing effectiveness and safety: of active principles among each 
other, and between the reference drugs and the generics of the same active 
principle. It should also signal to doctors and to the population that the 
manufacturing conditions comply with minimum quality standards. And, 
most important, it should consolidate this information, for instance in of-
ficial therapeutic guides, so that the physician would have all the elements 
in order to compare effectiveness and safety of drugs with each other. Lack 
of this information gives room to the laboratories to provide information 
for their own benefit, distorting the quality signals in the market. 
9 More precisely, bioequivalent drugs “are pharmaceutical equivalents that do not present statistically 
significant differences with respect to bioavailability when they are administrated in the same molar 
dosage.” (ibidem).
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It is worth noting that even after the original patent expires, the original 
patent holder loses the monopoly of the drug, but not of the brand, there-
fore it is in the interest of the firm to promote the brand, as promoting the 
substance ends up generating positive informational externalities (spillovers) 
in favor of the generic suppliers.10 To some extent, it is hard for the profes-
sionals themselves to distinguish quality dimensions related to the substance 
from those dimensions that separate reference drugs and generic drugs. 
The consequent uncertainties create a quality differential perceived by the 
agents, which is appropriated by the leading firm by charging a higher price 
associated to the brand. In case the drug’s patent is not enforced (as it was 
indeed the case in Brazil from 1969 to 1998), brand promotion becomes 
even more important, since the laboratory has to differentiate its product 
from early competitive entrants.11
It is true that the entrants can replicate sales promotion expenditures when 
introducing new brands. In the case of the intra-substance competition, this 
cost should even be lower than the one incurred by the pioneer, because the 
doctor already knows the substance and its therapeutic properties, and it is 
up to the firm to persuade him of the equivalence – the pioneer would thus 
be internalizing the cost of certification (the tests above mentioned and any 
other applicable ones), which would convey the same information to the 
doctor. But it is important to note that this cost is as sunk as the pioneer’s 
cost; now, once the pioneer’s sunk cost has been incurred, it is irrelevant for 
his later behavior, while the entrant’s sunk cost defines the latter’s strategy 
10 Advertising becomes more persuasive, in detriment of its informational character, according 
to HURWITZ & CAVES (1988) and LEFFLER (1981). Still, in countries where patents 
are enforced, it is noted that advertising and promotion expenditures are concentrated in the 
first years right after introduction and, as the patent expiration draws close, these expenditures 
decrease quite quickly. Although we do not have data to prove, we can conjecture that the 
trajectory of the expenditure level is smoother along time where patents are not enforced. 
Though it may sound a contradiction that advertising expenditures are lower at the end of the 
patent lifetime — when the laboratories should be reinforcing such expenditures — we should 
stress once more that in the presence of a signal for the consumption decision makers that the 
generic drug is bioequivalent to the pioneer drug, the substitutibility perceived by those agents 
is far greater; therefore investments in advertising and detailing are much lower. This seeming 
contradiction is resolved by noting that there are two factors that are distinct but use to occur 
jointly: the patent enforcement and the formal acknowledgement of bioequivalence between 
the pioneer and the generic drug. 
11 Executives of the laboratories themselves admitted this behavior in informal discussions at 
Seae, an office of the Ministry of Finance in charge of the economic evaluation of mergers and 
acquisitions and other antitrust cases.
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when entering. Even if we do not assume that the cost is sunk, the intangible 
asset created by investment in the brand (a goodwill stock for the brand) 
is already given for the pioneer, as opposed to the entrant.
Another issue in the pharmaceutical market besides the credence good 
nature of the product is that there is a distinction between who makes the 
choice of the medicament (the doctor) and who consumes it (the patient). 
In addition, who pays for the medicament may be the patient (the most 
common arrangement in Brazil) or a third party, such as a public health 
system (most common in Europe and Japan) or a private health plan (most 
common in the USA). This separation between the choice maker and the 
payer can be represented in Economic Theory as an agency problem (moral 
hazard): the Principal (the patient) wants to maximize his/her expected 
utility, which takes into account not only the probability of the state of the 
world where the patient enjoys good health, but also the expenditures of the 
treatment, in case the patient becomes ill. The agent (the doctor) should do 
this calculation, but he/she is more concerned with maximizing the patient’s 
health (or at least minimize the risk of damage to the patient’s health and 
consequently the risk of a lawsuit) and not necessarily will be bothered by 
the amount to be spent on the prescription.12 Even if he/she does not bother 
about the patients’ health, he/she will hardly worry about the expenditure 
if it is reimbursed by a health plan.13 Moreover, the required information 
on relative prices demands some (costly) effort from the doctor.14
12 The modeling of this sort of behavior can be found, among other sources, in LISBOA & 
MOREIRA (2000). If the payer of the treatment is a public or private health plan, two levels 
of Principal-Agent relationship overlap: besides the relationship mentioned above, another one 
is between the health plan as the Principal, aiming at maximizing profits, and the patient as the 
Agent, with the same utility function mentioned earlier. For the sake of our present empirical 
exercise, however, this distinction is irrelevant, as we remind the reader that the drug coverage 
by health plans is virtually absent in Brazil. 
13 HELLERSTEIN (1994) supports this argument by reporting that the average expenditure 
of the patients without any coverage was US$ 212 in 1987; whereas the average expenditure 
of Medicare members (also without coverage) was US$ 266, and of the (covered) Medicaid 
members was US$ 399.
14 HELLERSTEIN (1994) mentions a case study where a home delivery pharmacy service, 
Medco, contacts physicians and try to persuade them to substitute generics for the actually 
prescribed drugs; their success rate varied between 25 and 30  percent of the tries. This dem-
onstrates the willingness of physicians to be price sensitive when adequate information about 
price and efficacy is provided to them.
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Actually, the distinction between payer and patient has three dimensions: 
on the one hand, when the payer is the patient, the latter can place a more 
direct pressure on the doctor to have a cheaper medicament prescribed; on 
the other hand, a health plan or public health service works as an insur-
ance, which smoothes the individual expenditure path along time and, in 
addition, has a larger information set on the existence and relative price of 
available generic drugs to replace the prescribed drug. The net effect of these 
three factors is uncertain. But a point is that, in the absence of clear rules of 
substitution of generics for branded drugs (what in turn presuppose quality 
certification) and an efficient surveillance of drug sales in drugstores and 
pharmacies, substitution of prescribed drugs is subject to the discretionary 
power of patients and pharmacists.
As a result of the ever-increasing costs of the innovative drugs by firms in 
the industry, combined with the difference in objectives between Principal 
(patient) and the Agent (physician), the share of expenditures on drugs 
in the households’ budgets have grown and motivated a great number of 
changes in the regulation of the pharmaceutical sector and of health expen-
diture systems in several countries. One of the main strategies on hands of 
the regulators to bring the drug prices down is the promotion of generic 
drugs. Experiences of inducing substitution of generics for the originally 
patented brands after patent expiration vary among countries. In the USA, 
this subject have been dealt with by specific state legislations that have been 
gradually modified, either to allow the pharmacists to dispense a medica-
ment other than the one prescribed by the doctor or even to obligate them 
to dispense the generic regardless of the version prescribed, unless the doctor 
rules it out in the prescription.
The approaches of Western European countries, where most of the citizens 
are reimbursed by public health services, have been to place boundaries on 
expenditures and to spread information by: 1) creating very strict lists of 
drugs subject to reimbursement (the so-called positive lists); 2) establish-
ing reference prices, price controls or price reduction agreements with the 
industry; 3) designing prescription guidelines; 4) inducing substitution of 
generic for branded drugs; 5) creating prescription budgets for individual 
doctors, groups and regions; 6) requiring co-payments. Thus, in a way or 
another, incentives are sought for doctors and patients to economize in 
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prescriptions. In the USA, this kind of policy is implemented by private 
insurers (health plans, HMOs and PBMs) instead of the public system.
2. EXPENDITURES ON PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS IN BRAZIL
2.1 Evolution of Protection Policy to Pharmaceutical Industry
In Brazil, the legislation did not recognize patents of chemical-pharmaceuti-
cal products as from 1945. In 1969 the recognition of process patents was 
also suspended, and this situation prevailed until 1996, when a new Patent 
Act was passed under a severe pressure of developed countries before the 
WTO (World Trade Organization), covering both products and processes. 
During the process-patent-free period several attempts were made to de-
velop indigenous process technology in the pharmaceutical industry by the 
national-development wing of the military regime every time  they took the 
presidency of CEME, the Medicament Distribution Authority.15
CEME’s autonomist project did not resist, however, to the internal con-
tradictions of the military regime, which alternated in its managing posts 
technocrats and politicians in line with opposing views about the role of the 
State in providing medicaments to the population, thus causing a strong 
discontinuity in its supporting activity. The autonomist project was then 
severely harmed during President Collor’s term: as trade was liberalized 
in 1990 and market protection was phased out, very few laboratories kept 
their production capacity with some vertical integration.16 In 1996 the new 
Patent Act was passed and enacted, in response to the pressures for TRIPs 
15 CEME became the symbol of failure of a Brazilian attempt to replicate the experience of 
other countries that, according to BERMUDEZ (1992), made use of the absence of patents 
to develop strong pharmaceutical industries and only recognize patents once they acquired 
competitiveness. The author cites names, such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Japan 
and France.
16 Local production dropped from 60 percent of the market in 1987 to 18 percent in 1998. 
(QUEIROZ & GONZÁLEZ, 2001).
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(Trade Related Intellectual Property agreements) placed during the Uruguay 
Round. This new law ended up tearing down the project of technological 
autonomy. The perverse side of the consequent vertical disintegration of the 
pharmaceutical industry is that pharmaceutical intermediate imports have 
served the interests of Multinational Corporations in practicing transfer 
pricing: by inflating import prices, not only the internal costs are inflated 
and the branches’ profits are artificially reduced (and so are taxes levied on 
them), but also royalty remittances to the headquarters (and their respec-
tive taxations) are avoided.17
It is worth noting that the domestic active principles were not subject to 
tests of bioequivalence to the reference drugs’, rather they were approved 
according to international standards. Drugs based on both domestic and 
imported substances by those producers had typically only the bioavail-
ability approved. The so-called Generic Drugs Act of 1999 names this type 
of drug a similar drug, which is obliged to adopt a fantasy name (instead 
of the generic name) so as not to free ride the public campaigns in favor 
of the use of generics — otherwise the drug must be submitted to the bio-
equivalence test. In addition, the pharmacist is also subject to legal penal-
ties if he dispenses a similar drug (instead of a generic) in substitution for 
the reference drug. It becomes more difficult thus to deceive the consumer 
alleging that the drug is generic because it bears the generic name (besides 
the fact that the generic can be recognized by a special label provided by the 
Ministry of Health). And in case the similar drugs are really bioequivalent 
and do have quality, or in case it does not cost so much to adequate them to 
the required specifications, their manufacturers will benefit from publicity 
17 SILVA (1999) cites a true story, where a given substance, identified by a fake name hyperten-
sil, was imported from the headquarter to a local branch of a multinational corporation. The 
Import Tax rate was just 2 percent for that substance, while the Income Tax rate was at most 
25 percent, besides the Contribution on Net Profit (10 percent). It is clear that it paid to the 
multinational to practice inflated transfer prices in this case, which is probably not an isolated 
example: the maximum rate applied on the import good codes referring to pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals (sections 28 to 31) was 41 percent only for five months in the beginning of 1998, 
and remained below 20 percent during 33 months from January 1995 to December 1998.
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on generics, availability of lists of generics, etc. (made by the Ministry of 
Health) if they pass the tests, thus saving advertising and detailing costs 
and compensating for the tests’ costs.
2.2 Recent Evolution of Drug Prices and Firms’ Profits
According to the Household Expenditure Survey (named POF after its Bra-
zilian acronym) wave ran by IBGE (the Brazilian Bureau of the Census) in 
1987-88 and utilized to calculate the consumption bundle of the National 
Consumer Price Index System, the share of pharmaceutical products in 
the budgets of families with earnings between 1 and 40 minimum wages 
in October 1987 was 2.55 percent. In September 1996, according to the 
second POF wave (run in 1995-96) this item’s share had risen to 3.55 
percent. Moreover, based on the first POF wave’s weighting structure, the 
prices of the pharmaceutical products  group rose 116.52 percent from July 
1994 (date of the Real Plan) to October 2000, whereas the general index 
rose 94.60 percent only.
Graph 2.1 depicts the evolution of pharmaceutical prices relative to the 
consumption bundle in the 1990s. The relative prices increased consider-
ably, especially in 1992-93, following the end of drug’s price control. That 
moment of margin recovery set up a new price base level, very much above 
the one in effect during the 1980s. From 1994 to 1995 the base level was 
lowered (though still above the level of the previous decade), probably due 
to a fall of imported raw material cost after the appreciation of the Real, 
and this was followed by a period of relative stability (finished in 1999 with 
the depreciation of the Real). 
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GRAPH 2.1 - RELATIVE PRICES
Source: IBGE and IBRE/FGV. Prices of the various sub-items are measured as sub-item/general 
index ratios.
Table 2.1 displays the pharmaceutical industry’s profitability in the 1990s. 
The industry’s profitability followed a cyclical behavior in the same period, 
that is, it increased in the first four years and decreased from 1997 on. The 
early 1990s were marked by a comprehensive process of unilateral trade 
liberalization and by high inflation rates. Liberalization may have had a 
positive impact on average prices, leading to the industry’s profit increase. 
However, the high inflation rates of the period renders a conclusive analy-
sis of the balance sheets in that period very difficult, as tax law distortions 
favored negative net outcomes, and inflation facilitated these outcomes.
From 1994 on, upon the successful stabilization program Real Plan, the 
outcomes are as expected. Right after the Real Plan was launched, the ex-
change rate was severely appreciated and the real disposable income went 
up, so the import costs went down and the average profitability increased. 
The succession of external crises, in particular from 1997 on, the accelerating 
depreciation of the exchange rate, and the economic contraction brought 
forth a visible decrease to the industry’s profitability, especially in 1999, 
when the laboratories refrained from raising prices after an agreement with 
the Federal government.
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TABLE 2.1 - PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S PROFITABILITY
 Weighted Average (in percentage)
Net Proﬁt / 
Total Assets
Net Proﬁt / 
Equity
Net Proﬁt / 
Gross Sales 
Revenue
Net Proﬁt / Net 
Sales Revenue
1990 -1,90 -4,51 -2,31 -2,86
1991 -3,17 -5,25 -5,63 -6,64
1992 3,86 5,98 7,41 8,61
1993 5,44 7,45 10,79 12,74
1994 17,71 24,38 19,33 23,19
1995 10,33 14,76 9,28 11,14
1996 13,99 21,61 11,07 13,42
1997 12,01 18,05 7,64 9,90
1998 11,80 18,42 7,78 9,99
1999 8,06 15,34 5,52 7,16
Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Economia (IBRE/FGV).
2.3 Patient-Doctor Relationship in Brazil
Even though it is a well-known trait of the Brazilian culture (and docu-
mented, for instance, by Loyola, 1984), self-medication appears not to be 
a quantitatively significant problem. An explanatory analysis of a special 
supplement of the Annual National Household Survey (PNAD, after its 
Portuguese acronym) on Health undertaken by Andrade and Lisboa (2001) 
tabulated the types of health care demanded by families that recalled a 
health problem in the recent past. Almost all families reported that looked 
for medical assistance when they manifested symptoms of some disease, 
regardless of income level and location. The poorest stratum (first decile) 
headed mostly to local public ambulatories — the percentage ranged from 
50 percent (North) to 72 percent (South). In second place, this stratum 
went to other ambulatories (inside hospitals, clinics, working place or labor 
union facilities) — the percentage varied between 18 percent in the South 
and 42 percent in the Northeast. Most of the rest went to an emergency 
room or to a private office. Only a little above 2 percent (average over all 
the income cohorts) reported having gone first to a pharmacy or other care 
providers — the percentage was higher for the sixth through eighth deciles. 
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It is also worth noting that the shares of population that went to private 
office-based doctors increased approximately as much as the share that went 
to public ambulatories decreased, as we move up along the cohorts. For 
example, 66.06 percent of the first decile in the Southeast went to public 
ambulatories and 3.98 percent to private offices; in the tenth decile 6.03 
percent  went to health stations and 64.26 percent to private offices.
3. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
As mentioned above, the physicians - the consumption decision takers - are 
in general regarded as having incomplete information on the drug options 
available for the treatment of various pathologies, in particular with respect 
to their cost. Therefore, no wonder that the initiative of providing informa-
tion or even imposing controls on drug reimbursements arose in hospitals 
and health maintenance organizations (specifying, for example, a positive 
list, i.e., a list of prescribable generics). These firms reap scale economies 
(in transaction costs) in procurement and generic list making; therefore 
they seem to have most of the incentives to lower costs (e.g. hospitals paid 
through flat payment arrangements). In this sense, Frank and Salkever 
(1991) and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) claim that the segment 
of the population uncovered by health plans tend to be less price-elastic, 
because neither the doctor nor the patient have complete information on 
the efficacy of lower cost drugs, and the former tends to prescribe on a 
customary basis. In addition, Leffler (1981) mentions that sales promotion 
expenditures for drugs mostly sold in pharmacies are much greater than 
the ones sold in hospitals, as the latter have enough scale to set up cost 
committees and compare cost-effectiveness of drugs.
However, competition from generic drugs takes place only when the lead-
ing brand’s patent expires. Investments in sales promotion of these brands 
in general follow a pattern of high amounts right after introduction and 
decline as the expiration date draws near. An explanation is that the adver-
tisement and detailing would have an expansive effect on the demand for 
the substance, and the generic products would benefit by free riding on 
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them, so the laboratory that traded the drug’s original brand would have 
a disincentive to invest in advertisement.
An important finding of Frank and Salkever (1995) is that generic drugs’ 
entry gives rise to market segmentation: the incumbents prefer keeping 
prices elevated and catering to a more price-inelastic (brand loyal) market 
segment than lowering prices to defend market share against the generic 
drugs, who flourish in more elastic segments. In fact, in some cases the 
price of the original brand increases. Since the generic products gain market 
share, the net effect is a decrease of the average drug price in that market. 
The authors propose a model where branded drugs would behave like 
Stackelberg price leaders and generic drugs would be the followers, only 
that the latter would compete among themselves so as to reach a Cournot-
Nash price equilibrium.
Hurwitz and Caves (1988) studied the impacts of generic entry on market 
share, sales promotion expenditures and number of entrants in the USA 
and found that the brand’s market share is directly proportional to its own 
age (this was interpreted as brand loyalty) and to sales promotion, and 
negatively correlated to the entrants’ potential expenditures and to the 
number of entrants. The number of new entrants was directly proportional 
to the total size of the market and to the original brand’s age. Grabowski 
and Vernon (1992) analyzed the impact of generic entry that followed the 
Waxman-Hatch Act. Like Frank and Salkever (1995), they found price 
increases for the branded drugs.
4. MODEL AND DATA DESCRIPTION
The present work aims to explain the drug price behavior in Brazil with mar-
ket observed variables. In particular, we estimate the impact of the degree 
of concentration in each market on the leaders’ prices and on the relative 
prices of similar and generic drugs, as well as the degree of dispersion of 
the latter. We are unaware of any previous study of this type in Brazil.
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Several econometric studies were made in the United States during the 
1990s intending to study the impact of generic entry on prices of drugs 
whose patents had expired. In particular, the work of Caves, Whinston 
and Hurwitz (1991) illustrates the main aspects of the typical economet-
ric approach used in that analysis. The authors selected a sample of thirty 
drugs that lost patent rights during the period 1976-87 and estimated the 
following equation for the branded drugs:
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where:
 pit is the price variation (difference of logs) of product i in period t;
 i is the product-specific unit cost;
 t is a constant for the own marginal cost in period t;
 Ait are variables related to the time of exposure of the brand in the 
market;
  is the vector of parameters related to the elapsed time of exposure 
of the brand in the market, to be estimated;;
 Eit are variables related to the degree of competition in the market for 
generic drugs;
  is the vector of parameters — to be estimated — related to the degree 
of competition in the market for generics;
 it is the error (unobserved variable);
The generic drugs had an equation of their own:
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where:
 super scripts B and G refer to brand and generic respectively;
 P is price in level;
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 i is the quality differential of the generic as compared to the branded 
drug;
 g reflects the fact that the entry of a generic can affect existing generic 
and branded drugs differently;
 uit is the error (unobserved variable);
Adopting this approach for the Brazilian market should incorporate the 
specific features that distinguish it from the European and the American.
1) Inexistence of patent protection until 1998;
2) Existence of branded similar and unbranded similar drugs, in view 
of inexistence of generic product regulation, notably with respect to 
bioequivalence tests;
3) Predominance of imported raw material;
4) Inexistence of reimbursement for expenditure on drugs by private 
health plans or the government.
Items 1 and 2 imply that doctor and patient distinguish drugs mainly on 
the basis of how long they have been in the market and of sales promo-
tion effort, since there is no unbiased signaling available from an official 
agency, such as a therapeutic guide. Item 3 suggests that the exchange 
rate and a reliable estimate of the cost of imported raw material would be 
good proxies for the cost of material of the products. Therefore, similarly 
to Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991), we distinguish the leading drug 
only, which is the best selling brand — and usually the oldest brand avail-
able of that molecule —, but the age variables do not have a reference date 
related to a patent.
The data used in this study comes from a sample of sales from distribu-
tion companies to the retail drugstores and pharmacies - this highlights 
the importance of the fourth item, otherwise we would be studying a far 
smaller share of the demand, as the segment of great purchasers would have 
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a greater weight in the total.. The therapeutic classification is the anatomical 
one, adopted by the World Health Organization, i.e., drugs are grouped 
according to the part of the body where they act — e.g. nervous, digestive, 
and respiratory systems, etc. Two difficulties arise from this classification: 
(1) there exist drugs of different Active Principles (or multiple APs) in a 
same class; (2) some drugs with different indications are present in more 
than one class. 18
Thus, we resolved to adopt a market definition as restrict as possible: drugs 
based on a same substance (and only one substance) listed in the same class. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the therapeutic classes according to the Anatomic 
Classification. One-digit classes are subdivided into two-digit classes, and 
so forth down to the four-digit. Our sample selection went through the 
following steps: (1) we excluded products marketed mostly in clinics, hospi-
tals, labs and emergencies (blood derivatives, hospital solutions, diagnostic 
agents and vaccines), because, as we mentioned in section 3, these segments 
face scale economies in processing comparative information on drugs, by 
appointing committees to select drugs also on the basis of cost-effectiveness, 
as opposed to the paradigm doctor-patient formerly pointed out, and end 
up displaying a higher sensitivity to prices; (2) we selected the best-selling 
non-patented single-substance brand of each class (thus avoiding a mixture 
of very distinct markets); (3) we excluded subclasses with revenues below 
US$ 30 million, or where all drugs were multi-source (e.g. vitamins); (4) 
we oversampled antibiotics and analgesics classes, given their high share 
in total revenues. The resulting initial sample, of 44 substances in 43 sub-
classes, was reduced later because of important missing information in 
some of them.
Once the substances had been selected, we searched on the Pharmaceutical 
Dictionary (Dicionário de Especialidades Farmacêuticas - DEF) all the drugs 
marketed in Brazil containing, each one, only one of the chosen substances. 
18  Ideally we should obtain a sample of prescriptions grouped by pathology, so as to learn truly 
which drugs compete (are substitutes) to each other, and where. In case we could access such 
data (which we happen to know that exist), this would be a most interesting extension of the 
present work. 
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For the estimated regressions, we tabulated only the revenues accruing from 
the version (e.g. pills, solution, etc.) with the highest share in that drug’s 
total revenue, including different concentrations, as long as they could be 
prescribed for the same treatment. According to each drug’s directions, 
capsules of different concentrations could be combined so as to add up to 
the prescribed daily treatment, and this was done the following way: the 
measure unit was the lowest concentration ratio; the others were rescaled by 
this ratio. On the one hand, this approach prevents comparing sales across 
imperfect substitute versions (with different routes of administration, e.g. 
applied through mouth, on skin or directly into the bloodstream); on the 
other hand, it does not distinguish packages of different sizes - this may 
represent a serious problem in Brazil, because the total dosage prescribed 
by the doctors is rarely an entire multiple of the box size, and this creates 
indivisibility problems that may affect the patient’s purchase decision in an 
unknown fashion (perhaps the consumer chooses a smaller size, regardless 
of the dosage-adjusted price). Ruling out the latter problem, we regard 
as “price” the money amount per dosage unit (obtained by dividing total 
revenues of the version by the weight of the substance content).
We have also tried to match each drug with the respective sales promotion 
expenditure associated to the brand and with the imported raw material, 
obtained from the Brazilian Secretariat of Foreign Trade. In both cases, 
however, the apparent measurement errors were too many, so we decided 
to give up the attempt and to restrict ourselves to age and sales data.19
We have also tried to include the real exchange rate (according to the 
Purchase Power Parity - PPP) as a proxy of the imported raw-material 
cost. We believed that adding observations and eliminating measurement 
errors would compensate for the use of a macroeconomic variable, which 
19 In particular, transfer pricing by Multinational Corporations and over-invoicing by domestic 
firms in the industry leaves to us no parameter of the real opportunity cost of imported raw 
material; moreover, many firms import raw materials through trading companies; last but not 
least, many substances are listed in too general import categories, along with other very differ-
ent salts. As regards advertisement, the laboratories themselves complained that the available 
statistics from market survey companies are very far from their own private estimates; insuf-
ficient sample size and methodological imputation errors are potential explanations.
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is constant across all drugs. Moreover, that variable would reflect better 
the firms’ global cost variations. However, the big exchange rate shock of 
1999 introduced an excessive noise in the estimated effect of this variable; 
that noise translates into a forecast bias for the price behavior in 1999. We 
opted therefore for including only a dummy variable for the year 1999, 
which should capture the shift of the price floor resulting from both the 
exchange rate shock and the agreement between laboratories and the federal 
government to contain price raises (but may also capture other variables, 
as we comment below).
We rewrite then the model by Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) as:
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where:
 M(⋅) is a macroeconomic cost function, known up to the parameter 
vector ;
 B is a set of cost components common to all drugs in a same period t;
Also note that the drug’s specific cost is assumed to have its own trend, 
so that the fixed effect is not completely eliminated by first differentiation 
of the function above. Differentiation is due to the disparity of price lev-
els among drugs after being normalized to a common scale (kg) — what 
motivates the different i’s —; moreover, our goal is to find a common 
behavior pattern.
Next, we differentiate (4.1a) in time and make linear approximations for the 
differences of M(⋅), h(⋅) and f(⋅) functions. We proxy the first one with the 
industry’s wage variation in the period, w
t
. The second was approximated 
by a second-degree polynomial of the age logarithm, because, in conformity 
with the Product Life Cycle Theory, drugs may have their markets saturated 
from some point on. The third one was proxied by the market share varia-
tion, as the number of drugs did not change visibly during the period. The 
new equation is therefore the following for leading brands:
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 (4.3)
where:
 = price per kg of leading drug based on substance g in period t, 
in PPP Reais of 1999;
 ∆ln(Share_Q) = variation of logarithm of the firm’s share in output 
of the market defined by substance g;
 Age = number of elapsed years between introduction and observation 
years; this variable and its square are a polynomial approximation of 
the substance’s product life cycle;
 ∆w = percentage variation of wages in the pharmaceutical industry in 
Reais of 1999; it measures the variation of processing the substance 
domestically;
 D_99 = dummy equal to 1 in 1999; 0 otherwise; it measures the 
impact of government intervention in 1999, right after the devalu-
ation of the Real, when an agreement was negotiated to contain the 
pass-through;
 e
gt
 is a random error, i.i.d. along time and across groups.
The regressions were estimated both on the full sample (1995-99) and on a 
restricted sample (1995-99). Other macroeconomic variables, such as GDP 
and interest rate, were discarded because they showed a strong multicol-
linearity (correlation with each other and with other explaining variables, 
especially the exchange rate variation) — if not in the full sample, at least 
in the restricted period —, thus rendering impossible the matrix inversion 
for estimation. All the deflation procedures were undertaken by using the 
Broadened Consumer Price Index (IPCA), and when PPP was called for, 
by IPCA and the U.S. wholesale price index.
If we are not interested in the estimation of the 
g
 as fixed effects (FE), 
we can model them as random variables, i.i.d. across groups but constant 
along time (random effects - RE). To decide between the two specifications 
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(FE and RE) in each pair, we performed the Hausman test. (HAUSMAN, 
1978).
Last but not least, it is important to note that the market share variation is 
a variable determined endogenously by the price variation, thus being cor-
related to the error. Therefore we instrumented it with the Herfindahl-Hir-
schman Index (as a measure of market concentration) of the corresponding 
substance in t -1. The estimates listed below were obtained by Instrumental 
Variables (actually Two-Stages Least Squares - 2SLS); in the RE case, the 
specific method adopted was Baltagi’s (1981) Error Component 2SLS.
TABLE 4.1 - FIXED EFFECTS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMA-
TION
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
Number of observations 147 110
Number of substances 38 38
Average number of obs./drug 3. 87 2. 89
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
D_ln(P
kg
) Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Constant -0,036370 -0.11454 -0,036010 -0.09614
D_Ln(Share_Q) -0,123320 -0.09966 0,269563  0.12472
Age 0,005525  0.14031 0,007108  0.13960
(Age)
2
-0,000600 -1.62400 -0,000420 -0.90345
D_W 0,001353  1.35916 0,001200  0.88209
D_99 -0,177150 -1.77351*           
R2 0,89 0,57
Joint 
signiﬁcance:
F(6,103) = 135,19*** F(5,67) =  17,70***
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TABLE 4.2 - RANDOM EFFECTS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTI-
MATION
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
D_ln(P
kg
) Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Constant -0,05482  -7.04367*** -0,080850   -8,80281***
D_Ln(Share_Q) -0,26651  -4.25489*** -0,330210   -3,69308***
Age 0,003774   4.78461*** 0,006707    7,08845***
(Age)2 -5,53E-05  -2.80928*** -0,000120   -4,97809***
D_W 0,001051    8.33806*** 0,001004     8,78833***
D_99 -0,22035 -23.05939***
R2 0,83 0,52
Joint signiﬁcance: F( 12,250) = 209,08*** F( 10,177) = 37,53***
Hausman Test: 15,27 Prob(H>2 (5))  = 0,01 3,41 Prob(H>2 (4))  = 0,49
(*) Significant at 10  percent; (**) Significant at 5  percent; (***) Significant at 1  percent.
Note that the RE specification came out with more precise estimates than 
the FE, both in the full and in the restricted sample. Although the first 
(full sample) Hausman test rejected H0, the second one (on 1995-98) did 
not. As 1999 was an atypical year, due to the government’s acute interven-
tion, we understand that the sample until 1998 is more representative of 
what comes to be an intervention-free market equilibrium. Furthermore, 
RE’s efficiency is greater when no evidence exists of correlation between 
explaining variables and unobserved individual effects. A priori, we should 
not expect to find such correlation, so we credit the rejection by the test in 
the full sample to the great difference of estimation caused by intervention. 
In view of that, we opted for the RE estimation.
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GRAPH 4.1 - DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECASTED OR FITTED 
AND OBSERVED VALUES
To have an estimate of the predictive power of our model, we present on 
Graph 4.1 the differences between the variations forecasted for 1999 (by 
the restricted sample RE model) and the observed variations in that year, 
and we find that on average the forecast overestimates the real variation in 
21 percentage points, with a standard deviation of 7 p.p. This effect is in 
part due to the price agreement between the Federal Government and the 
manufacturers that occurred in 1999 — and the number is very close to the 
estimate of the D_99 dummy for the intercept (app. 22 p.p.) —, but can 
also be explained by indirect effects of the exchange rate realignment on the 
pharmaceutical market, especially the variations of GDP, interest rate and 
inflation, that could not be identified by the model; thus, in the absence 
of these effects, the agreement would be the only factor responsible for 
preventing drug prices from increasing 21 p.p. above the observed raise. 
Now, when we estimate the model to 1999 (still with RE) , the expected 
fitted variation equals the average observed variation, that is, the bias is 
null – the standard deviation is 7 p.p. only.
Examining the estimates obtained, it is worth emphasizing that, as opposed 
to the common sense prediction - but in accordance with results obtained 
by the empirical studies reported in Section 3, the price of leading drugs 
raises more when the leading laboratory loses market share. This indicates 
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that the laboratories alter their price fixing strategy when they lose room 
in the market, as they prefer catering to less price-elastic consumers and, 
therefore, collecting higher markups on lower volumes.
The age polynomial indicates that prices follow a typical product life cycle 
pattern; they grow more and more as the product becomes more known, 
up to a “maturation point”, when the price raises finally decelerate and may 
become negative. It is worth noting that we cannot identify the intercept 
of the age polynomial, but only the sum of it to the other intercepts.
The interpretation above of laboratories’ behavior is reinforced by another 
regression, also inspired in Caves, Whinston e Hurwitz (1991) — formula 
45.2 above — where also the relationship between leader prices and fol-
lowers’ prices is given by the following equation:
 (4.4)
where:
 HHI_Q is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of market output con-
centration;20
 HHIG_Q is another Herfindahl-Hirschman index, but excluding the 
leader - this index measures market share inequality among followers 
only;
 tEntry is the elapsed time in number of years since the entry of the first 
competitor of the pioneer brand;
 εgt is a random error; 
 ωg is a time-invariant individual effect.
20  We utilized the lagged concentration index to avoid endogeneity and because it could not serve 
as an instrument, because it was too correlated to the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 4.3 - FIXED EFFECTS LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
Number of observations 109 80
Number of substances 31 29
Average number of obs./drug 3,52 2,76
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
D_Ln(Ps/PL) - Average Coefﬁcient t-Stat Coefﬁcient t-Stat
Constant 0.0122  0.0650 0.0741  0.2266
(HHI_Q) t-1 -0.1758  -0.6145 -0.2614  -0.5292
(HHIG_Q) t-1 0.1575  1.7080* 0.1670  1.0803
tEntry 0.0014  0.0985 0.0006  0.0237
D_99 -0.0185  -0.6377
R2 0.07 0.05
Joint signiﬁcance: F( 5,64) = 1.02 F( 4,36) = 0.49
The results are on Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Note that a decrease of total market’s 
concentration may be due to a decrease of the leader’s share (and conse-
quently to an increase of the followers’ share), captured mostly by the first 
HHI, or to a fiercer competition (reduction of inequality, or entry of new 
competitors) within the similar drugs’ segment, which is better captured 
by the second HHI. Hence, the positive sign of variable HHI_Q combined 
with the negative sign of HHIG_Q indicates that the two types of market 
structure movements have different effects on relative price: in the first 
case, when the market concentration is diminished because of a fall of the 
leader’s share, this means that the similar drugs are gaining room in the 
market, so they have more market power to raise their prices relative to 
the leader; in the second case, when the redistribution is within the seg-
ment of similar drugs, they compete more intensely among themselves 
and have their average price reduced as compared to the leader.21
21  The estimated mean error in 1999 is zero in the first regression (7 p.p. standard deviation) and 
2 percentage points (4 p.p. standard deviation) in the second.
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TABLE 4.4 - RANDOM EFFECTS LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION
1995-99 Sample 1995-98 Sample
D_Ln(Ps/PL) – Average Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
Constant -0.0058  -0.2663 -0.0058  -0.2153
(HHI_Q) t-1 -0.1028  -3.8231*** -0.1106  -3.1949***
(HHIG_Q) t-1 0.0848  3.4576*** 0.0887  2.9501***
tEntry 0.0035  3.9646*** 0.0037  3.2416***
D_99 -0.0359  -1.8419*
R2 0.14 0.10  
Joint signiﬁcance: F( 10,173) 
=
 5.81*** F( 8,116) = 3.32***
Hausman test: H = 1.54 Prob(H>χ2 
(4)) =0.82
H =0.31 Prob(H>χ2 
(3)) =0.96
(*) Significant at 10 percent; (**) Significant at 5 percent; (***) Significant at 1 percent.
The results also indicate that, when the pioneer brands have been facing 
competition from similar drugs for a longer time, the prices of the latter 
increase relatively to the former. This means that the ability of similar drugs 
to raise prices relatively to the leading brand is greater, the greater is the 
market concentration and the time the consumer had to grow accustomed 
to having options besides the pioneer brand on the pharmacy’s shelf, or, 
seen from another perspective, it means that the ability of the leading brand 
to distantiate its price from the similar drugs’ is deteriorating.
Combining all these results, we conclude that in markets where the leader’s 
presence is weaker (as measured by market share), the similar drugs are able 
to raise their prices more easily; on the other hand, a fiercer competition 
among similar drugs brings their prices down relatively to the leader’s. The 
leader in turn, when it has a more undermined market share, prefers cater-
ing to a more price-inelastic segment and raising prices. In sum, we find 
that the general price level goes up when the followers gain market share: 
not only does the leader raise its price along time but also the followers are 
able to raise their prices (on average) relative to the leader, thus reflecting 
the latter’s higher market power.
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CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the regressions indicate that prices of leading drugs respond 
positively to the wage growth rate in the industry. Price raises are also greater 
when the leader is losing market share to similar or generic substitutes; this 
indicates that, very similarly to what Frank and Salkever (1995) found in 
the U.S., the leaders prefer retreating to a less price elastic market segment, 
the one that is more reluctant to substitute a similar drug for the pioneer 
brand. The similar drugs’ manufacturers in turn reduce the ratios of their 
prices to the leaders’ in response to the entry of new competitors (on aver-
age), but raise them when they win market share over the leaders.
Note that we could not include the exchange rate as an explaining vari-
able, because of an immense multicollinearity with the dummy D_99. If it 
were included instead, it would come out with the same negative sign of 
the dummy. The negative impact of the dollar’s appreciation against the 
Real in 1999 on the drug price variation may be surprising. This result, 
however, just indicates that the domestic currency devaluation is not passed 
through completely to the local drug prices in real terms. Note that some 
pass-through indeed occurred: in our sample the raise was 29.45 percent  
in nominal terms on average. But it was an incomplete pass-through: the 
exchange rate rose (average against average) 51.83 percent, so the real (PPP) 
price fell 22.4 percent. Our model fits quite well these figures: in nominal 
terms, our model predicts a 29.39 percent  raise; in real terms, the PPP 
figures went down 22.38 percent.22
Another important result is that corroborating the product life cycle theory, 
the power to raise prices of the laboratories is increasing up to a certain 
point (approximately twenty eight years, the turning point of our estimated 
polynomial) and then eroding. Note that our estimates point out to a very 
long life cycle, with a turning point above, for instance, the patent life in 
the U.S. This agrees with the theory described in the previous sections.
The results obtained contradict the usual intuition that entry of new com-
petitors should lead to a reduction of prices charged by leading firms. Our 
estimates point out exactly to the opposite: in consonance with empirical 
22  All the variations are calculated on the yearly averages.
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studies undertaken in developed countries, we estimated that leading drug 
prices react positively to penetration of similar drugs into the market; 
the flip side of the coin is that the average level of similar or generic drug 
prices tends to go down and its dispersion relatively to the leader’s price 
tends to go up when competition within the fringe becomes tougher. If 
on the other hand the fringe (especially if there is some sort of “sub-leader” 
included as a follower) wins a greater market share, the prices of similar 
drugs tend to go up relatively to the leader.
This result signals that measures facilitating generic drugs’ entry will have 
differentiated effects on the consumer, according to the segments they 
belong to: more conservative consumers, who refuse to substitute a ge-
neric/similar drug for the leading brand, will face a rise of their medical care 
costs, while those more willing to accept a replacement will in average face 
lower and lower prices as the market is pulverized among various suppliers. 
This means that the dissemination of generic drugs will have progressive 
effects on income distribution if the consumers’ degree of conservativeness 
is positively correlated to their income.
The finding that the prices of similar drugs increase relatively to the leader, 
the longer they have been in the market, suggests that the beneficial impact 
of entry is diluted as time goes by.
The estimated model also demonstrates that macroeconomic cost (wage) 
shocks influence positively the industry’s inflation; on the other hand, 
demand shocks (variations of domestic income, interest rate and general 
inflation) could not be identified, because they were too correlated to labor 
costs and the exchange rate shock of 1999. The combination of these shocks 
with the subsequent government intervention, negotiating an agreement 
with the industry representatives, are responsible for the price increase be-
ing 21 percentage points below what PPP would project to 1999, given 
the direct shock in the exchange rate.
It will be interesting to check in the future the effects of the new Generic 
Drugs Act and of the massive advertising campaign ran by the Ministry of 
Health thereafter on the consumer’s perception regarding substitutability 
among branded, generic and branded generic (“similar”, which did not 
undergo bioavailability tests) drugs. It is quite possible that this massive 
campaign in the media reduces dispersion of consumers’ information and 
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consequently the price dispersion as well, even if market concentration goes 
up. Thus, in case a reduction of informational asymmetry about generic 
drugs’ quality occurs, it is possible that a reduction of market concentration 
leads to a decrease of the leading drugs’ prices.
Another interesting exercise will be assessing the entry of generic drugs 
in markets currently protected by patent when the first patents expire, as 
a comparison to the retrospect of developed countries will be much more 
immediate.
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